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ABSTRACT 
Structured sale and leasebacks and corporate property asset outsourcing are often claimed 
to have benefits that seem to be inconsistent with financial theory. Eight such UK deals are 
analysed to investigate the impact on corporate value. The results show that impacts are 
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contingent — on the capital structure of the firm, on the use of the capital raised and on 
market attitudes towards management and the sector. Two apparently similar deals can have 
quite different outcomes: benefits to shareholders and bondholders cannot be simply 
assumed. 
 
Keywords: outsourcing, sale and leaseback, capital markets, event study 
 
<Main text commences> 
INTRODUCTION 
Much attention has been focused on the use by corporate occupiers of structured sale and 
leasebacks or securitised disposals of real estate assets. For instance, high-profile deals in 
the UK retail sector include two securitised disposals by Sainsbury’s and the sale and 
leaseback of 78 stores by Marks & Spencer. Great claims are made about the benefits of 
such activities. However, corporate finance models suggest that many of the supposed 
advantages could be eroded by the reaction of bondholders and shareholders to the new 
corporate structure. This article examines the arguments for such deals and tests if their 
announcement has any affect on company value using statistical techniques.  
 
OWN OR LEASE? 
The decision whether to outsource or to retain ownership of a corporate property portfolio is 
similar to the decision whether to buy or to lease new assets. The latter has been studied 
extensively in the field of corporate finance, and much theory that has been developed there 
is relevant to the asset outsourcing context.1 In particular, sale and leaseback transactions 
have traditionally been seen as a form of financing and can be analysed accordingly. Several 
arguments have been developed in favour of such deals, but theory suggests that not all of 
these arguments are valid. 
Recently, there has been a movement towards new models, which involve 
outsourcing more than merely the ownership of property and which have a greater focus on 
future business requirements for space. These have been developed as new arguments for 
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outsourcing have emerged, such as the need for companies to focus on their core 
competencies and to increase transparency of costs. The newer models and reasons for 
outsourcing may provide better justification for the outsourcing decision. Therefore, both 
traditional and recent arguments for outsourcing the ownership of real estate are now 
considered within the finance theory framework. 
 
Financial arguments for leasing 
Leasing gives a company an alternative method to ownership to gain use of an asset. In the 
UK, leases in a sale and leaseback or outsourcing deal are often structured as operating 
leases, although the arrangement may seem more financial in nature.2 Treatment as 
operating leases means that, under current UK accounting standards, the rental liability does 
not appear on the balance sheet. However, proposals by the UK Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB), if adopted, will change this, requiring all lease liabilities to be disclosed, 
whatever their nature. 
This accounting treatment has led some people to argue that sale and leaseback 
disposals of property provide ‘off-balance sheet financing’. As the resulting liability does not 
currently appear on the balance sheet, a company that outsources property may appear 
stronger financially than one that owns its real estate and uses debt finance. Research into 
the issue, though, finds that investors do take into account the liabilities of companies that 
enter into lease arrangements. For instance, Beattie et al.3 analysed a sample of 161 UK 
companies and found evidence to suggest that operating leases were reflected in equity risk. 
This implies that investors are aware of the underlying effects of such deals and adjust prices 
accordingly. Further, a firm seeking to achieve an ‘optimal’ capital structure can use either 
conventional debt or leasing with the same capital-market impact.  
Another argument is that leasing provides ‘100 per cent financing’. If a company is 
seeking to raise capital using property assets, through outsourcing ownership, it is possible 
to raise an amount equivalent to the full value of the assets. In contrast, when properties are 
used as security for lending, most lenders impose a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in order to 
protect their capital from falls in real estate values. So it would appear that, by outsourcing, 
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more capital can be raised. However, the corresponding liability will also be greater and 
theory suggests that this will have three effects. First, the effective gearing will be higher than 
if debt had been used, so the required return on equity will also be higher, reducing market 
capitalisation. Secondly, the additional liability will restrict the ability of the company to 
borrow further. The extra amount gained from leasing displaces the opportunity of debt. 
Thirdly, the loss or ring fencing of assets can lead to pressure on ratings of the existing 
senior debt.4 
A stronger financial argument is that capital tied up in property ownership may be put 
to better use within the business. The company should be able to earn a higher rate of return 
for shareholders by investing it in business activities. In fact, where the company’s required 
return is greater than that generated (notionally) by the property assets, it may be argued 
that by holding property the company is ‘destroying’ value. So a firm with a required return of 
20 per cent may be damaged by holding real estate assets whose value reflects a yield of, 
say, 8–10 per cent. This will be particularly evident to analysts employing a structured 
technique such as Economic Value Added,5 but it will also be evident in conventional 
accounting measures such as Return on Capital Employed. Capital could also be generated 
through raising debt on the strength of the property assets, so the potential additional 
benefits of outsourcing to the business must be carefully considered and priced where 
appropriate. Further, the property returns may be less risky than the business activity, which 
would be reflected in shareholders’ expected returns. 
 
Operational arguments for leasing 
A major argument for outsourcing in general is that companies should focus on their core 
competencies. The ownership and management of property are very often outside the main 
functions of a business. Management time and resources could be better spent focusing on 
the main business functions, non-core activities being outsourced to other firms for which 
that activity is core. This may improve profitability, as the company can focus on areas where 
it has expertise and can generate higher returns. The company does lose control over the 
assets, however, and it is often argued that if properties house a strategic function or are 
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integral to business operations then they should be retained, whether or not property is a 
core competency.6 
Complete outsourcing of real estate functions not only transfers the assets; it also 
transfers the responsibility for service provision, often to a specialist provider who may be 
able to benefit from scale economies and expertise, lowering the overall costs of provision — 
although this is unproven empirically. Such savings may not be available in conventional or 
structured sale and leasebacks, but presumably form the basis of firms’ decisions.7 If total 
occupancy costs were lowered, there would be longer-term benefits to the income statement 
and for operating margins. This, in turn, has implications for future profits and expected 
dividend payments and should, thus, have an impact on equity and bond prices.  
Outsourcing may benefit a company through risk transfer. By owning corporate real 
estate, a company is exposed to changes in property values, but if it leases, then those risks 
are borne by another party. In particular, it could be argued that a specialist real estate 
investor or service provider is better equipped to assess and bear the risks of property 
ownership. However, depending on how an outsourcing deal is structured, a company could 
be faced with a new source of risk from the rental market. This risk is exacerbated under 
traditional UK lease structures, with their long terms and upward-only rent reviews, where the 
occupier is exposed to cost increases in strong markets, but does not benefit from cost 
reductions in difficult market conditions. In some recent deals, rental risk has been reduced 
by negotiating fixed rent increases rather than reviews to market and by special provisions 
with regard to reletting. 
Companies outsourcing their real estate portfolios may also be seeking greater 
flexibility and freedom of action. Under traditional sale and leasebacks, this may not have 
been achievable, the lessee being committed to a long term and having only limited and 
costly options for exit. Therefore, owning may have provided a more flexible option. In some 
recent outsourcing arrangements, however, companies have negotiated more flexible 
arrangements with regard to space, so that they can vacate or alter properties as their 
business requirements change. This enables real estate to be integrated more into the 
business planning cycle. Nevertheless, even with the more flexible deals, long overall 
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contracts with providers are often still required in order to make the financing work. For 
instance, the contract between BT and Telereal is for 30 years. Where securitisation has 
taken place, long contracts are necessary to provide the long maturity necessary for the 
bonds issued to be marketable and have a low enough coupon to justify the deal. In some 
circumstances, this could be a constraint on a company’s future actions. 
 
EXAMPLES OF ASSET OUTSOURCING AND SALE AND LEASEBACK DEALS 
To consider the impact of real estate outsourcing deals on company value, eight UK 
transactions carried out by six companies were selected for analysis. Their selection was 
influenced by a number of factors. Deals were chosen only where there was a transfer of 
assets to another party and the properties involved were occupational properties. 
Furthermore, so that the reaction to the announcement and its effect on value could be 
assessed, the selling organisation needed to be a quoted company. 
The companies chosen for analysis were: 
 
 Abbey National and BT, who outsourced both space and property-related 
services 
 Marks & Spencer and J Sainsbury’s, whose outsourcing deals were funded 
through securitisation 
 Kingfisher and Shell, who undertook more traditional sale and leaseback deals. 
 
The basic characteristics of each deal are shown in Table 1. No judgment about the deals is 
intended in the descriptions used. 
<Insert Table 1 (f. 20) near here> 
The Abbey National deal has received much attention because it was one of the first 
attempts at total property outsourcing in the private sector.8 Abbey’s entire portfolio of 1,320 
properties was transferred to Mapeley, who, in return, provide the bank with both property 
and facilities management. The structure is highly flexible, but that flexibility has come at a 
cost, with the initial rent roll of £80 million representing 17.5 per cent of the £457 million 
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raised. The BT deal has also attracted attention, because of its sheer scale in terms of both 
the number of properties and the amount raised. As well as outsourcing both space and 
services, the purchasing vehicle, Telereal, used securitisation to raise capital. 
The other deals were more traditional in structure in terms of the lease arrangements 
for the occupiers. There were, however, some features that differentiated them from straight 
sale and leasebacks. In the transaction with Topland, Marks & Spencer negotiated vacation 
options, while in its other deal it pre-agreed substitutes in case its plans for the selected 
stores changed. In its second deal Marks & Spencer also agreed fixed uplifts, which were 
also a feature of the two Sainsbury’s deals, where rents are increased by 1 per cent per 
annum rather than reviewed to market. Securitisation was used to fund all three of these 
transactions. In its deal, Shell was able to agree some substitution and vacation rights. 
By outsourcing real estate and taking leases in place of ownership, the capital 
structure of all the companies will have been affected. Balance sheet gearing may remain 
unaltered, but, as was argued earlier, the effective gearing will have changed and analysts 
will take this change into account. The effect on the value of the equity and debt can 
therefore be hypothesised from the change in capital structure caused by each transaction 
and the subsequent use of the capital raised. As the leases are long-term liabilities, theory 
suggests that such transactions will have a similar effect on value to raising debt. 
Where the capital has been used to reduce debt, it might be expected that the effect 
on the equity value of the company will be fairly neutral, because one type of liability will 
have been substituted for another. If the capital has been put into the business or used for 
share buybacks, then gearing will have increased and the remaining equity will be more 
risky, so a fall in equity value might be expected to reflect this. If funds are reinvested in 
business activities, though, there may be positive effects if investors perceive that such a 
move will add value by earning returns above the company’s cost of capital. The additional 
features of more recent outsourcing deals may also have an effect, if it is perceived that they 
too will add value to the firm’s activities. 
In practice, though, it may be difficult, for several reasons, to judge the ‘pure’ impact 
of outsourcing on company value. First, most of the deals took some time to be completed, 
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so there is a question about when the impact should be tested. Typically, the period around 
the formal announcement is examined; however, information may well leak out into the 
market in advance of that date. Secondly, share and bond price data can be very ‘noisy’: 
random price movements and volatility may mask events. Thirdly, before and during the 
negotiating period there are likely to be other events happening that affect each company. 
These ‘confounding factors’ may frustrate the analysis by making it very difficult to determine 
what the actual impact of the real estate transaction was. Kingfisher is an extreme case: its 
sale and leaseback was linked to the demerger of the Woolworths retail chain, which 
precluded analysis of the deal.  
 
Testing market impacts 
The starting point for our analysis is the standard assumption of corporate finance that the 
true value of the firm is signalled by the capital market — that is, the value of the firm is the 
sum of the market value of the firm’s equity and the market value of the firm’s debt. 
Furthermore, the capital markets provide information on the risk of the firm relative to the 
market. As a result, the consequences of a corporate real estate outsourcing, a structured 
sale and leaseback or other restructuring should be reflected in the firm’s stock-market and 
bond-market prices. We use statistical methods to investigate the impact of the deals 
outlined above.  
We use two broad models to investigate capital market reactions: event study 
methodology and an extended single index model analysis. Both examine the change in 
equity and bond prices immediately before and in the period after the announcement of the 
restructuring. Other authors9 have used similar methods on more conventional sale and 
leaseback and corporate real estate decisions.  
The starting point is the estimation of the expected return (price change) on the stock 
in each time period. For this, we use a standard single index model: 
 
Rit =   + i Rmt + i             (1) 
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where Rit is the return on the firm in period t; i is the firm’s beta (its sensitivity to overall 
stock-market movements); Rmt is the return on the market index in period t; and i is the 
‘abnormal return’ or residual — the return that is unique to the firm in that period and not 
explained by market movement. The expected (or average) value of i is zero. 
For most analysis of equities, Rm is the return to the overall stock market — in the UK, 
a proxy for this would be the return on the FT All Share index. Over the second half of the 
1990s, however, the market became increasingly segmented, the strong performance of 
growth stocks (in particular high-technology stocks and the dot.coms) being markedly 
different from that of value and defensive stocks. In the subsequent dot.com bust, value 
stocks relatively outperformed the previously favoured growth, technology and IT sectors. As 
a result, the conventional single index model often fails to explain much of the share-price 
movement of companies. 
As a result, an alternative specification based upon sector indices is tested. Equation 
(1) is re-estimated using an index of General Retail, Food Retail, Bank, Oil or Telecom 
stocks as appropriate. The price data used are weekly and adjusted for stock splits, rights 
issues and dividends; they run from January 1997 to January 2003. Data series were 
extracted from DataStream and from data provided by the Government’s Debt Management 
Office. Table 2 shows the results of this process.<Table 2 near here> 
 
Table 2: Stock betas of selected companies 1997–2003 
 
 
Company 
Proportion 
Explained by 
FT All Share 
 
Market 
Beta 
 
Relevant 
Sector Index 
Proportion 
Explained 
by Sector 
 
Sector 
Beta 
Abbey National 23.4% 1.13 Banking 54.2% 1.03 
British Telecom 20.6% 1.13 Telecom 48.9% 0.78 
Kingfisher 16.2% 0.93 Gen. Retail 53.4% 1.24 
Marks & Spencer 15.8% 0.95 Gen. Retail 56.8% 1.24 
J Sainsbury’s 3.1% 0.33 Food Retail 56.2% 1.08 
Shell Trading 28.2% 1.03 Oil 
Integrated 
79.3% 1.06 
 
For most firms, the sector indices offer much higher levels of explanation than does 
the overall stock market index. For example, Sainsbury’s price variations are weakly 
explained by the stock market but strongly explained by the Food Retailing sector. For other 
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firms, the results are consistent with similar studies and with prior research on market and 
specific risk. 
 
Figure 1  Time windows in event study 
 
The next step is to specify an ‘event window’. This is the time around the 
announcement of the restructuring. Event studies assume that information ‘leaks’ into the 
market place in advance of the announcement and that the market processes the information 
swiftly, changing prices as appropriate. With property announcements, it is here assumed 
that there may be considerable leakage in advance of the formal announcement. After 
testing various specifications, the present authors have used a ten-week window that runs for 
four weeks in advance of the announcement week and five weeks after the announcement 
week (see Figure 1). 
<Figure 1 near here> 
In the event study, attention is focused on the residual returns in the event-window 
period. Given that the expected or average value of the residual returns over the whole 
analysis period is zero, we can examine the residual returns in the event window alone to 
gauge market reaction. If the market feels the announcement adds to the overall value of the 
company, then residual returns will be positive (that is, the share or bond price will have 
A
EW
PEv
AP
AP = analysis period
PEv = post event period
EW = event window
A = announcement date
time
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increased by more than expected). By contrast, if the news is considered unfavourable, then 
stock prices will fall by more than is expected, giving negative, abnormal, returns. These 
individual abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) — the sum of the 
residual returns over the event window — are then examined, being tested to see whether 
they are statistically significant. 
Where the announcement points to a change in the capital structure of the firm, this 
may affect the overall risk of shares relative to the market. For example, a sale and 
leaseback in effect increases the gearing of a firm, which in turn increases the volatility of 
equity returns. As a result, shareholders may demand higher returns — reflected in an 
increase in the firm’s beta. To test this, an extended version of the market model from 
equation (1) is run: 
 
Rit =  + PEv + i Rmt + j Rmt * PEv + i           (2) 
 
PEv is a (dummy) variable indicating that the return occurs in or after the event 
window — that is, when the market has knowledge of the proposed change. i  represents 
the firm’s beta before the announcement and (i + j ) represents the firm’s beta after the 
announcement. If j  is positive, then shareholders perceive the company to be more risky 
than before and demand a higher return for holding equity in the firm.  
The same analyses are conducted for bonds as for equities, although the 
interpretation is not so straightforward. An unexpected increase in bond prices relative to 
overall bond-price movements (here proxied by the change in prices in a broad index of 
government securities) suggests that the firm’s bonds are considered less risky — that 
bondholders require lower coupon rates. However, the interpretation of the betas in 
equations (1) and (2) is less straightforward — it is, in effect, a measure of the firm’s 
sensitivity to interest-rate shocks. 
 
RESULTS 
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In this section, each of the case studies is examined in turn, using both the event study and 
single index models described above. The authors analyse change in each firm’s stock-
market equity prices and, where possible, changes in the price of a representative corporate 
bond issued by the company.  
 
Abbey National 
The Mapeley deal to take over Abbey National’s operational property commitments needs to 
be seen as part of a wider restructuring of the firm in the light of takeover discussions and 
rumours. Share-price movements are particularly sensitive to takeover rumours — and to the 
trading performance that fuels such rumours. The property outsourcing could thus be 
interpreted as action aimed at fending off takeover bids — by propping up equity prices 
through return of cash to shareholders; by utilising the cash to strengthen trading position; or 
even, as was suggested, by creating a ‘poison pill’. 
Examining the cumulative abnormal returns from the single index model suggests 
that shareholders reacted relatively positively to Abbey National during the announcement 
period — the results being statistically significant. However, the results of examining the 
abnormal returns on the basis of an index of banking sector stocks are somewhat less clear. 
Using both extended-market and sector models, there is no evidence that shareholders 
considered Abbey National either more or less risky after the announcement; the beta 
remains unchanged in the post-event period. 
<Figure 2 (f. 12) near here> 
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Figure 2  Abbey National cumulative abnormal equity returns10 
Bondholder reaction to the deal might be expected, in isolation, to be more negative. 
The outsourcing removes some of the security for debt holders in the event of default, while 
the additional leases represent an effective increase in gearing and raise issues concerning 
bankruptcy costs. However, if reinvesting capital raised in the business improves earnings 
potential, then this may improve security of interest cover. Finally, the takeover rumours open 
the possibility of the debt being assumed by a bank with a higher credit rating. Abnormal 
price movements around the announcement date are positive and significant, suggesting that 
bondholders looked favourably on the company in this period. 
<Figure 3 (f. 13) near here> 
In summary, there is weak evidence from the capital markets that the Abbey National 
outsourcing was viewed favourably and that both bonds and share prices were higher than 
expected around the time of the announcement. It is difficult to distinguish between the 
effects of the outsourcing and other moves by the bank in this period. 
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Figure 3  Abbey National cumulative abnormal bond returns 
 
British Telecommunications (BT) 
The Telereal deal also represents a near-total outsourcing of operational property, BT raising 
some £2.3 billion. The proceeds were largely used to resolve the company’s cash position 
and to buy down debt but, as noted above, the lease liabilities incurred are, in effect, another 
form of debt, leaving the gearing position more neutral than was portrayed. Analysis is made 
difficult by the long spread between rumours and completion. BT declared its intention in 
January 2001 (and there had been discussions long in advance of this). The preferred bidder 
was announced in April 2001 (we have taken this to be the firm announcement point), with 
agreement for sale occurring in June and practical completion in December of 2001. The 
deal period coincides with a rights issue and with the demerger of MMO2, both of which 
would have affected capital structure and income prospects.  
There is little discernible evidence of the outsourcing having any impact on BT’s 
equity prices. Although some abnormal returns are significant using the market model, there 
are both positive and negative results, which cancel out when considering the cumulative 
returns. The same holds for the sector model: the outsourcing does not seem to have 
affected share prices. By contrast, the deal appears to have had a positive impact on bond 
prices. This might be attributable to the resolution of the immediate cash position and, thus, 
the risk of default or delinquency. Although some of the cash was used to redeem existing 
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debt, the remaining debt holders have lost fixed-asset security and BT has incurred new 
liabilities in the form of the operating leases. Nonetheless, actual bond prices are higher than 
the values predicted, using the market model with change in gilt prices as the reference 
index. 
<Figure 4 near here> 
Figure 4  BT cumulative abnormal bond returns 
 
In the period after the announcement, there is a striking and statistically significant fall 
in BT’s beta in relation to both the overall equity market and the telecommunications sector. 
Whether this can be (in part) attributed to the outsourcing deal is moot, given that the period 
includes the rights issue and, in particular, the flotation of MMO2. Whatever the reason, the 
market perceived British Telecommunications as less risky in the post-event period. 
 
Marks & Spencer (M&S) 
The two M&S deals were examined separately. Neither produced discernible impacts on 
share prices using either event study or single index model methods. There is no apparent 
impact on bond prices. The capital markets appear indifferent to the two deals. As suggested 
above, it may be that the negative effects of increased gearing and the possibly low sale 
price achieved in the first deal are offset by the prior announcement of returning cash to 
shareholders and possibly higher implied values for the remaining real estate assets.  
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J Sainsbury’s 
The two Sainsbury’s structured sale and leaseback deals in 2000 are similar in structure, 
although the first and larger deal, Project Redwing/Highbury Finance, received much more 
attention than the second. Share-price reactions will be influenced by market assessments 
as to managerial ability to add value from the proceeds obtained (and the slight increase in 
gearing), since the funds raised were to be reinvested in the business in an attempt to 
improve return on capital.  
Share-price reaction to Project Redwing appears to be negative. In both market and 
sector models, the cumulative abnormal returns are strongly statistically negative around and 
after the announcement date; there is a particularly strong negative reaction in the week of 
the announcement itself. There is a slight, but non-significant, increase in market beta after 
the deal was announced, but the main reaction seems to be to mark prices down in relation 
to both the overall market and other food retailers. 
<Figure 5 near here> 
Figure 5: Sainsbury’s cumulative abnormal equity returns 
Sainsbury's Project Redwing - Equities, Sector Model
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This negative response is not echoed in share-price movements around the time of 
the second deal. One can speculate on the difference in the reactions observed — changed 
market sentiment towards management or towards food retailing as a sector; the active 
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promotion of the benefits of the structured sale and leaseback model; observation of the use 
of the capital proceeds. Given the similarity of the two deals and of their impact on the capital 
structure of the firm, the contrast in reactions is striking. Sainsbury’s bonds seem unaffected 
by either deal. 
 
Shell Trading 
We anticipated that there would be little impact on Shell Trading’s equity prices from the sale 
and leaseback of 180 petrol stations, given the size of the deal in relation to the market 
capitalisation of the company. (Even though the deal raised £300 million, the firm had a 
market capitalisation of £46 billion at the end of 2001.) Furthermore, the sale and leaseback 
was private and attracted little publicity and comment. The cumulative abnormal returns are 
weakly negative, but the statistical significance of this effect disappears quickly after the deal 
is completed. The data available on Shell’s bonds behave strangely and seem curiously 
uncorrelated with gilt prices. The cumulative abnormal returns are weakly negative, which 
would be consistent with an increase in effective gearing; it would however, be dangerous to 
over-interpret this result. 
<Figure 6 near here> 
Figure 6  Shell Trading cumulative abnormal bond returns 
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Aggregate results 
In event studies, it is common to aggregate results across companies to investigate whether 
general types of reaction can be observed. This exercise was carried out for all the corporate 
real estate deals analysed here. However, as might be expected from the individual results 
discussed above, there was no evidence of a common impact. We repeated the exercise for 
the retail sector deals alone. There was again no evidence of a common pattern of 
behaviour, the net effect of deals being broadly neutral for both equity and bond prices. An 
apparent negative movement at the point of the announcement in the sector model seems to 
arise almost entirely to the market’s negative reaction to the first of the Sainsbury’s 
structured sale and leaseback deals. The implication seems to be that the capital-market 
impacts of restructuring of corporate real estate are highly conditional, depending on the 
particular nature of the deal, its effect on capital structure and the proposed use for the 
proceeds. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis sought to identify share and bond price movements linked to corporate real 
estate outsourcing or leasing deals, assuming that capital markets can judge the full impact 
of deals on the future risk and return of the firm and, thus, adjust their required return. This 
should result in a change in prices in relation to the market or the sector. The price changes 
will reflect stakeholders’ assessments of the full benefits and costs of the deal, both financial 
and operational. It should be stressed that it may be very difficult to discern a relative price 
change in the general noise of market movement, particularly where the deal is relatively 
small in relation to the firm’s overall operational scale or asset base, or where there are other 
events that would have share or bond price impacts. Nonetheless, general conclusions may 
be drawn.  
First, two deals with apparently similar structures can have quite different impacts. 
Evaluation of the costs and benefits depends on the final impact on the capital structure 
resulting both from the deal and from use of the proceeds from that deal. Since a structured 
sale and leaseback is a debt liability, it will increase the gearing of the firm. The final capital 
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structure, however, will vary greatly, depending on the use of the capital raised: to retire 
existing debt, to buy back shares, or to reinvest in the operational activity of the company. 
With higher final gearing, equity holders require higher returns to compensate for greater 
potential volatility and exposure to interest-rate (or rental-market) risk. Bondholders will need 
to consider the balance between potentially improved cash flow and the loss of security for 
their capital once the proceeds have been applied; adjustments to default and delinquency 
risk lead to changes in required returns and, hence, in prices. 
Secondly, market reaction to the use of funds will depend on attitudes to the firm’s 
operational efficiency, the quality of management and the prospects for the sector and the 
type of activity which the proceeds support. If management are out of favour with the 
markets, then providing more capital for investment in operations is likely to promote a 
negative reaction. Retaining capital in the firm is valid only if the market’s anticipated return 
on that capital is greater than the returns the shareholders could get for comparably risky 
projects elsewhere; similarly, if the risk-adjusted returns from the firm’s use of the capital are 
less than the implicit return on the real estate assets, then outsourcing deals will not add 
value to the firm. It is these contingent effects that need to be emphasised.  
There is scope for more detailed work examining such deals. Analysis based on 
capital-market movements is problematic in this period because of the distorting effects of 
the dot.com and technology sector boom and bust. Some capital-market impacts may thus 
be obscured by the rapid changes in sentiment towards individual sectors. Furthermore, the 
limited number of case studies means that it is not possible to provide quantitative analysis of 
the criteria that lead to positive or negative impacts on share and bond prices. Nevertheless, 
the results set out above are consistent with prior US research on the impact of corporate 
real estate restructuring on share-price performance: there are potential benefits from such 
activity, but they cannot simply be assumed. There is no free lunch. 
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Table 1: UK outsourcing deals chosen for analysis 
Company Buyer Type of Deal Number of 
Properties 
Amount Raised Use of Funds Completion Date 
Abbey National Mapeley ‘Full’ outsourcing 1,320 £457.5m Reinvest in 
business? 
October 2000 
BT Telereal SPV ‘Full’ outsourcing 6,700 £2.38bn Reduce debt December 2001 
J Sainsbury’s Highbury SPV S&L and 
securitisation 
16 £335m Reinvest in 
business 
March 2000 
J Sainsbury’s Highbury SPV S&L and 
securitisation 
10 £232m Reinvest in 
business 
July 2000 
Kingfisher London & 
Regional and 
Goldman Sachs 
Sale & leaseback 182 £614m Reduce debt August 2001 
Marks & Spencer Topland Group ‘Flexible’ sale & 
leaseback 
78 £348m Fund share 
buybacks 
October 2001 
Marks & Spencer Amethyst SPV S&L and 
securitisation 
59 £331m Fund share 
buybacks 
December 2001 
Shell London & 
Regional and 
Rotch 
Sale & leaseback 180 £300m Reinvest in 
business 
December 1999 
 
Note to table. Information collected from assorted press releases, press articles, announcements and company accounts. In particular, the use of 
funds is that stated in press or publicity — actual use of funds may have been different. 
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